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ABSTRACT 
The search for competitive advantage is the defining inquiry of strategic management research. In 
this study, we draw on the dynamic capability lens to develop a counterintuitive view that positions 
competitors of a firm as an important source of competitive advantage. We argue that a firm’s 
competitors form a competition network from which it can collect information about innovative 
ideas, product market, and related industries. Such information helps it calibrate market 
opportunities, update the resource base, and, eventually, strengthen its competitive advantage. This 
positive effect of competition network on competitive advantage will reasonably be contingent 
upon the proactive information search by the firm. The empirical results based on the survey data 
of 631 Chinese firms strongly support our theoretical model. This study identifies another 
distinctive source of competitive advantage than industry context or organizational resources as 
well as advancing our understanding of competition network.    
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INTRODUCTION 
How firms obtain and sustain competitive advantage is the fundamental question in the domain of 
strategic management. Multiple research strands on this question have highlighted the role of a 
firm’s competitors. The emergence of new competitors may erode valuable competencies of 
incumbents or disrupt their market positions especially in regimes of discontinuous environmental 
change (Anand, Oriani, & Vassolo, 2010; Barney, 1991; Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015; 
Leiblein, Chen, & Posen, 2017). A firm is in a harsh industry if it simultaneously competes with 
numerous peers, in that intense competition renders it difficult to earn above-normal rents (Porter, 
1980). Some studies even portray the direct competition among firms as a battle in which a focal 
firm must remain alert to attacks from others and respond effectively to ensure its viability and 
future success (Chen, 1996; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999). As diverse as they may seem, all 
these stands unanimously treat competitors of a firm as its enemies in market, which do nothing 
but harm performance. Departing from them, this study seeks to explain how a firm can derive 
strategic benefits from its competitors and, in turn, strengthen its competitiveness. 
We advance our view on competitors by focusing on a firm’s competition network instead 
of a single competitor or a dyadic relationship with it. Here, competition network refers to ‘the 
relational structures of interdependence between rivals that emerge from direct competition’ 
(Skilton & Bernardes, 2015, p. 1688). Drawing from the dynamic capability (DC) lens (Salvato & 
Vassolo, 2018; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003), we argue that competition network 
can serve as an important source of competitive advantage. Fundamentally, competitors in the 
competition network hold critical information about market dynamics, from which profitable 
opportunities (or dampening threats) can be sensed (Chakrabarty & Wang, 2012). As a firm 
expands its ties with more competitors, it opens more accesses to valuable information about 
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technologies, market participants, and related industries, enabling it to beat rivals in market 
calibration and resource reconfiguration (Teece, 2007). A firm with a relatively larger competition 
network will reasonably outperform others.  
The strategic implications of competition network, however, may not apply equally to all 
firms. Per the DC research, firms will still perform differently even in the same context for their 
heterogeneous organizational routines and processes of sensing and seizing market opportunities 
and reconfiguring resources (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007; Winter, 2003). Given that 
the strategic benefits of competition network, in our conceptualization, are inherently 
informational, the routines and processes to search and assimilate information from the external 
environment (i.e., information search) are particularly relevant to the link between competition 
network and competitive advantage. The more a firm commits in information search, the more 
strategic benefits it presumably derives from its competition network. Absent effective search, 
competition network will remain dormant. So far, literature has identified three types of 
environmental change that tend to destroy the value of a firm’s extant resources and prompt it to 
develop or acquire new ones, namely technological breakthroughs (Chakrabarty & Wang, 2012; 
Fleming, 2001; Yan, Dong, & Faems, 2020), changes in market participants (Podolny, 2001; 
Sinkula, 1994; Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997), and evolution in other related industries (Porter, 1980; 
Teece, 2007; Terjesen & Patel, 2017). Subsequently, the corresponding search for technology, 
product market, and related industry information will strengthen the positive impact of competition 
network on competitive advantage.  
To verify our theoretical model, we collect survey data from 631 Chinese firms across 
industry sectors. The empirical findings strongly support the proposed influence of competition 
network. Throughout our regression models, the scale of competition network is consistently and 
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positively associated with the competitive advantage of a firm. The effect of the three information 
searches, nonetheless, varies: related-industry search significantly strengthens the competitive-
enhancing effect of competitive network, product market search does it marginally, and technology 
search has no moderating effect. The moderating effect, therefore, declines from related industry 
search, to market search, and to technology search. Taken together, evidence reveals that larger 
competition network breeds stronger competitive advantage, especially for firms that engage more 
search for information about related industries or product market.   
Being perhaps the first attempt to examine competition network from the DC perspective, 
this paper makes meaningful contributions to strategic management research. Firstly, we confirm 
that competition network represents an important but not-yet-recognized source of competitive 
advantage. Within a competition network, competitors are not merely enemies. Rather, they 
contain valuable information that is otherwise unavailable from other external constituents and, if 
effectively gathered and processed, can foster a firm’s competitiveness. Secondly, we incorporate 
a unique context (i.e., a firm’s competition network) to the analysis of information search, a micro 
process of a firm’s dynamic capabilities. As a firm knits its competition network, it gains sensors 
– i.e., its competitors – to environmental stimuli and additional pathways – i.e., the competitive 
ties with them – to glean external information. This insight sheds new light on how firms sense 
opportunities from the environment – a process that precedes opportunity seizing and resource 
reconfiguration but has remained insufficiently addressed. Thirdly, we reveal an important 
property of competition network, namely its information-specific carrying capacity. Competition 
network is powerful in carrying the competitiveness-enhancing information that is relevant to but 
not immediately about a firm’s own industry. This capacity subsides as the information (e.g., 
technological information) becomes more proprietary. Practically, this research helps firms build 
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a balanced view toward competitors and identifies concrete approaches for extracting the strategic 
benefits from competition network that, by itself, is a relatively novel dimension of the external 
environment.   
In the coming sections, we first briefly review studies on competitive advantage with an 
emphasis on the role of competitors. Next, we theorize on the mechanisms that link competition 
network of a firm to its competitive advantage and formulate hypotheses on the direct effect of 
competition network scale as well as the moderating effects of information search. The sample, 
method, and regression result then follow. We conclude the paper with the scholarly and practical 
implications of our findings.  
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND COMPETITORS: A BRIEF REVIEW 
Competitive advantage of a firm serves as a pivotal determinant to its performance and survival 
(Barnett & McKendrick, 2004; Barney, 2001; Leiblein et al., 2017). A firm is perceived to possess 
competitive advantage over rivals when it earns above-average return (Porter, 1980). Such 
advantage only lasts as long as others are unable to emulate it, highlighting the necessity of 
strategic renewal for a firm to stay ahead of competition. Subsequently, where does a firm gain 
competitive advantage is one of the most central inquiries in strategy research.  
Two dominant views emerge from studies on the source of competitive advantage. Rooted 
in industrial organization economics (I/O economics), the first view ascribes a firm’s competitive 
advantage to its industry context, giving prominence to such structural attributes as entry/exit 
barriers, bargaining power of suppliers or customers, etc (Porter, 1980; Takata, 2016). A firm, as 
this view goes, can gain advantage over rivals by astutely positioning in a profitable industry or 
endeavoring to shape the industry structure to its favor. The second view, resource-based view 
(RBV), asserts that competitive advantage of a firm resides internally in its resource and capability 
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endowments (Barney, 1991). This shift to an inward-looking approach stimulates an immense 
body of studies to explore the value-generating resources and capabilities within the possessions 
of a firm and identify various isolation mechanisms (e.g., causal ambiguity) that preserve the 
competitive value of these resources (Barney, 2001; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Naturally, RBV 
heavily emphasizes the development or acquisition of firm-idiosyncratic resources as the core 
competitive strategy (Barney, 2001; Leiblein et al., 2017).  
The distinction between I/O economics and RBV on competitive advantage is fundamental 
and evident, but they share a hostile stand toward competitors. According to I/O economics, 
increased competitors intensifies intra-industry rivalry and the advantage of incumbents inevitably 
wanes. Observed by Porter (1980, p. 80), ‘new entrants to an industry bring new capacity and a 
desire to gain market share that puts pressure on prices, costs, and the rate of investment necessary 
to compete.’ Similarly, RBV posits that a firm would be robbed of competitiveness once other 
firms surmount the isolation mechanisms to imitate or substitute its valuable resources and 
capabilities (Barney, 2001; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Particularly when new competitors bring in 
disruptive technologies that render existing technologies or assets obsolete, leading incumbents 
allegedly face jeopardy of losing its dominant position or even going bankrupt (Christensen et al., 
2015). 
Whereas most strategy research casts a negative light on competitors, few innovation 
studies allude to their positive potential. Notably, Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doeer (1996) consider 
competitors as important nods in a firm’s social network in which innovation-inspiring knowledge 
disperses. This is clear in their statement, ‘in industries in which know-how is critical, companies 
must be experts at both in-house research and cooperative research with such external partners as 
university scientists, research hospitals, and skilled competitors’ (Powell, et al., p. 119). Except 
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for occasional mentions, competitors have not received systematic scrutiny in innovation literature 
even though they are perhaps the most conspicuous constituents in the external environment. 
Instead, most innovation scholars have fixated on suppliers and customers whose relationship with 
a focal firm is explicitly collaborative and input to idea generation and innovation refinement 
apparent (Laursen & Salter, 2006; Lopez-Vega, Tell, & Vanhaverbeke, 2016; Phelps, 2010; 
Schilling & Phelps, 2007). To date, innovation literature yields little knowledge as to how 
competitors contribute to a firm’s innovation process – let alone its overall competitive advantage.  
A small thread in alliance literature seems to reveal a more concrete way that a firm’s 
competitors can be strategically beneficial. Here, alliance scholars observe that rivals sometimes 
collaborate – a phenomenon termed as coopetition (Luo, 2007) – to enlist such relational gains as 
risk and capital sharing, economy of scale, acquisition of proprietary knowledge, and consolidation 
of market power (Chen, Pun, & Wang, 2017; Raza-Ullah, 2020; Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 2004; 
Yan et al., 2020). Coopetition alliance, nonetheless, only rises in the presence of a strong 
cooperative bond (Phelps, 2010) and a meticulously designed formal governance structure 
(Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Chen et al., 2017; Dyer & Singh, 1998). In cases these fundamental 
conditions are not concurrently met, foes will unlikely become friends (Klein, Semrau, Albers, & 
Zajac, 2020; Raza-Ullah, 2020). Even if they do initially, the complex interplay between 
competition and cooperation usually imposes enduring but hard-to-manage tension (Hoffman, 
Lavie, Reuer, & Shipilov, 2018). At the point the alliance’s potential for value creation depletes, 
partners are prone to compete for value capture, thereby sabotaging the alliance performance or 
viability (Dyer, Singh, & Hesterly, 2018). Kogut (1989), for example, found that the odds of 
unexpected termination of an international joint venture increases when the partners 
simultaneously compete on the product market.       
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In summary, previous management literature is overwhelmingly negative as far as 
competitors are concerned, except for few studies on innovation and coopetition alliances (See 
Table 1). But those innovation studies merely imply a positive role of competitors without giving 
much in-depth consideration while the alliance research imposes a strict condition – i.e., a formal 
alliance – on it. In this paper, we acknowledge that the negative view represents only a partial 
understanding of competitors. Rivals can certainly resort to various strategic initiatives that 
undermine the advantage of a focal firm, e.g., repositioning in an industry context, imitation, or 
head-on confrontation. As we will argue below, they also contain useful information that, if 
properly leveraged, could enable a firm to further its lead. This is feasible even in the void of an 
alliance. The exclusively negative view, thus, could mislead firms to overlook an additional source 
of competitive advantage, raising an urgent call to supplement the current comprehension of 
competitors with the knowledge about their positive side.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, we build our research model within the DC framework. Here DCs refer to the 
organizational capabilities to ‘purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base’ (Helfat et 
al., 2007, p. 4). Guiding reliable, patterned changes in operational capabilities, DCs usually embed 
in organizational routines and processes (Winter, 2003), intertwine with business models (Teece, 
2018), and operate through the productive interactions and dialogues among individual employees 
within a firm (Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Asserted in this framework, the ownership of certain 
hard-to-replicate resources alone is insufficient to produce enduring competitive advantage since 
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environmental changes, especially the discontinuous ones, often render the valuable capabilities 
and resources obsolete (Anand et al., 2010; Chakrabarty & Wang, 2012; Dyer et al., 2018). To 
sustain the advantage over rivals depends critically on a firm’s capabilities of modifying resources 
to keep pace with or even lead environmental changes. A firm exercises its DCs primarily via the 
process of sensing opportunities or threats from market and then reconfiguring organizational 
processes or resources to seize the opportunities (or nullify the threats) (Teece, 2007). Following 
this line of argument, we propose that competition network of a firm, by feeding information on 
critical dimensions of the environment to the opportunity sensing process, would eventually bear 
on its competitive advantage.  
The direct effect of competition network 
A firm’s direct competitors form a competition network (Burt, 1992; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015). 
This network is egocentric, connecting a firm to the competitors within its perception but not 
beyond (Gimeno, 2004). The tie between a nod and the focal firm exhibits clear, competitive 
tension (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Madhavan, Gnyawali, & He, 2004). For these distinctive 
features, competitive network approach ‘opens the door to network studies of industries and 
populations that have been overlooked because they are not characterized by cooperative 
relationships’ (Skilton & Bernardes, 2015, p. 1696). Figure 1 visualizes the competition network 
of two hypothesized firms, A and B. A’s competition network comprises A1, B, and C while that 
of B includes A, B1, B2, B3, and C. As a common competitor to A and B, C appears in both 
networks.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
10 
 
As the nods linked to a focal firm, competitors in a competition network hold various 
critical information to market calibration and, in turn, to competitive advantage. First is 
technological information. Technological shifts, per the DC research, represent the most 
consequential environmental changes that tend to destroy the value of the current technologies and 
jeopardize the existing business (Christensen et al., 2015; Fleming, 2001; Teece, 2007). To remain 
viable and competitive, a firm must constantly monitor the technology evolution in its market and 
the opportunities or threats that may ensue. Although various sources may contain signals about 
the existing technologies and the future trend (e.g., research institutes), competitors have perhaps 
the most relevant knowledge in this aspect. They employ similar technologies and skills to serve 
the overlapping market and keep refining them through their research activities (Powell et al., 
1996). The technological information from its competition network offers critical input for a firm 
to forecast technological changes in its industry and then accordingly update its own skillset.    
Furthermore, competitors also provide information on other market participants, which 
may suggest opportunities in the external environment (Podolny, 2001; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015; 
Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997). In a market, customer preferences may evolve, suppliers switch 
operations, or regulative authorities enact new policies. Such changes from market participants 
can sometimes introduce fundamental turbulences in environment (Sinkula, 1994). To strive for a 
constant alignment with environment compels firms to continuously tailor their operation, 
organization, processes, and resources to the preferences of the market participants (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). As such, competitors can serve as reference points for the environmental 
dynamics caused by market participants, and this market-related information reasonably enhances 
a firm’s capabilities to translate technologies into well-received products or services (through 
product development and commercialization) (Kapoor & Klueter, 2015) or even to spot new 
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market segments (Chakrabarty & Wang, 2012; Sinkula, 1994; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015). For 
example, convenient store chains often infer the potential patronage traffic of one location from 
the nearby competing stores. Meanwhile, many firms become aware of foreign markets by 
observing the internationalization footprint of industry rivals (Knickerbocker, 1973).  
Triggers to environmental shifts, nonetheless, are not confined to internal factors like 
technological breakthroughs or dynamics in market participants but can originate externally from 
the development of other related (or co-specialized) industries, i.e., those with complements or 
substitutes to an industry’s products (Khanagha, Ansari, Paroutis, & Oviedo, 2020; Porter, 1980). 
Complements spawn market opportunities by elevating the value of the existing products, and 
substitutes pose threats by fulfilling the same market needs with alternative approaches. The 
appearances of complements or substitutes are usually dissimilar and their signals weak to perceive, 
making the resultant opportunities easy to miss but threats particularly disruptive. Surveying 
related industries, hence, is no less critical to opportunity sensing and seizing than attending to 
endogenous dynamics (Teece, 2007). The products or strategies of competing firms are often 
considered as one of the few observable indicators of the emergence of complements or substitutes 
from outside (Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997). After all, among various external parties, competing firms 
are the ones with the highest alerts to the evolution of related industries and often the first to 
respond.  
Situating a focal firm in the center, competition network affords numerous means for it to 
learn and/or access the critical information from its competitors. It is not uncommon that a firm 
obtains technological and market information from its competitors by closely monitoring media 
outlets (e.g., company webpage), attending public events like technology or product debut, 
studying patents, or even reverse-engineering products (Burt, 1992). Other formal channels 
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encompass inter-firm visits, industry association, or industry reports from independent research 
institutes, exhibition events, and so on (Podolny, 2001). Besides, the informal ties that rise from 
friendship, common customers, or the exchange of employees are sometimes more effective in 
penetrating the protection of competitors and accessing critical information (Carpenter, Li, & Jiang, 
2012; Podolny, 2001; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015)1.  
Competition network, therefore, would enhance the competitive advantage of a firm by 
enabling it to sense the opportunities triggered by the dynamics in technology, market participants, 
or related industries and updating its resource base responsively. This effect varies with the size of 
the competition network. In a large competition network, a firm ties up with numerous competitors 
and technically gains direct access to many sources of information about the external environment. 
Intuitively, it will sense the market opportunities or threats faster, positioning it among the early 
movers to make necessary reconfiguration in resources or processes. More important, the firm has 
a privilege to verify the credibility of the information through triangulating it among different 
competitors (Jolink & Niesten, 2020)2. It is less likely to fall victim to the misleading signals 
intentionally disseminated by its competitors. In contrast, a firm with a small competition network 
lacks direct ties with many other firms and may be blind to environmental shifts. Market calibration 
by this firm will be retarded or flawed compared to its well-connected rivals.  Consequently, it will 
either overly rely on the existing resources to the extent of path dependency or bear the risk of 
changing resources in an erroneous direction. In either way, its organizational resources and 
capabilities will easily drift out of alignment with the external environment and competitive 
advantage will hardly develop nor sustain (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2018). The above arguments 
suggest,  
                         
1 We are grateful to one anonymous reviewer for pointing out the role of informal ties. 
2  We are grateful to one anonymous reviewer for suggesting this important function of a large competition network. 
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H1. The scale of a firm’s competition network will increase its competitive advantage, all 
else being constant. 
The moderating effects of information search 
Depending on its scale, competition network will constrain or facilitate the inflow of important 
information to the market calibration process and correspondingly shape a firm’s competitiveness 
vis-à-vis other firms. Yet, as the DC research maintains (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 
2007; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018), firms may still perform differently even in the same context for 
their heterogeneous capabilities as well as the underpinning micro processes to calibrate and 
respond to market dynamics. These internal variances dictate that even though competition 
network constitutes a potential source of valuable information, how effective a firm taps into it 
and derives tangible outcomes will plausibly hinge upon the information search it commits. Here 
information search refers to the organizational processes a firm employs to sense, collect, and 
interpret external signals for identifying upside opportunities or downside risks (Martin & Mitchell, 
1998; Sinkula, 1994; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991). Previous research (Teece, 2007) has 
recognized information search as a critical micro process a firm exercises its DCs. To delineate 
more fine-grained insights, we decompose information search into three specific types – 
technology search, product-market search, and related-industry search – and respectively analyze 
how each of them influences the effect of competition network on competitive advantage.  
Technology search denotes the process of searching for new methods, processes, or skills 
in developing products or services (Fleming, 2001; Lopez-Vega et al., 2016). This search is 
increasingly deterministic to a firm’s success as ‘research breakthroughs demand a range of 
intellectual and scientific skills that far exceed the capabilities of any single organization’ (Powell 
et al., 1996, p. 118). It is also indispensable because truly useful technological assets or skills tend 
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to be under safeguards that isolate them from the public (Martynov, 2019; Yan et al., 2020). When 
an innovation emerges in a competition network, the firm with resources and processes designated 
to search for technological information will likely notice it ahead of others. This lead-time allows 
it to apply the innovative ideas and knowledge from its competitors to its own R&D process or to 
devise strategies to acquire the new technology (Anand et al., 2010; Laursen & Salter, 2006; 
Lopez-Vega et al., 2016; Martynov, 2019; Snihur & Wiklund, 2019). Consequently, it can update 
its technological capabilities to catch up with the new competitive realm, avoiding the danger of 
being rendered obsolete (Yan et al., 2020). By contrast, a firm that passively waits for the 
information on new technologies to come in would only learn about a critical innovation rather 
late and suffer from time diseconomy in altering its resources or processes (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
This firm would hardly gain or sustain a technology leadership position that is otherwise possible 
for its large competition network.  
H2. Technology search enhances the positive relationship between the scale of a firm’s 
competition network and its competitive advantage.   
Product market search involves the search for information regarding customer 
demographics and preferences, price, supplier operations, supply-demand fluctuations, and 
relevant regulations (Katila, 2002; Martin & Mitchell, 1998). Through a well-versed market search, 
a firm can gather and exploit more market-related information from its competition network, which 
intuitively strengthens its capabilities to size up market status quo and predict future evolution 
(Martin & Mitchell, 1998; Podolny, 2001; Sinkula, 1994). Product market information offers 
critical input to the processes of product development and commercialization (Kapoor & Klueter, 
2015; Skilton & Bernardes, 2015). Clear and thorough insights about market facilitate upgrading 
existing products or launching new ones that cater to market needs and expand market shares 
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(Martin & Mitchell, 1998). However, when market search is weak or absent, a firm will still be ill-
informed about market conditions even in a far-reaching competition network. The chance that it 
misjudges market dynamics and puts forth misoriented products is high, effectively putting a cap 
on the strategic benefits it could derive from its competition network. We therefore propose,  
H3. Product market search enhances the positive relationship between the scale of a firm’s 
competition network and its competitive advantage.   
Related industry search, by definition, is the organizational process to monitor and 
comprehend the development of related industries, particularly those with complements or 
substitutes to an industry’s products. Unlike technology or market search that are local for focusing 
on a firm’s own industry, related industry search is global or distant with a scope spanning across 
multiple industries (Iyer, Bau, Chirico, Patel, & Brush, 2019; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). 
Equipped with a strong related industry search, a firm is capable of sensing cues from its 
competition network regarding the development of potential complements or substitutes. This 
information then allows it to formulate effective and timely strategies in response such as altering 
its resources and processes to capture or even pre-empt the market space that initially sparked by 
other industries (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2018). A firm that confines attention only within its 
immediate industry may lose sight of the events from other industries in which profitable 
opportunities embed. Furthermore, this firm is more prone to develop learning myopia (Terjesen 
& Patel, 2017), organizational inertia (Miller & Chen, 1994), and strategic rigidity (Kapoor & 
Klueter, 2015), which prevents it from acquiring or developing necessary resources or capabilities 
to face the arrival of unexpected threats. The firm’s existing competitive advantage will falter and 
its demise may even loom. A case in point is the bankruptcy of Kodak caused by the rise of digital 
technology in other industries. Hence, absent the effective search for related industry information, 
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the firm with a large competition network will still be vulnerable to the threats of substitutes or 
miss the opportunities to use complements to enhance the value of its products. We therefore 
propose,  
H4. Related industry search enhances the positive relationship between the scale of a firm’s 
competition network and its competitive advantage.  
Figure 2 depicts our research model.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
METHOD 
Sample 
We collect data for this study via a survey to managers at the middle or even higher level of a 
company in China. The survey draws well-established items from previous literature, all of which 
use the seven-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Since the 
survey must be in Chinese, we employ the back-translation technique to ensure accuracy. We first 
translate the items from English to Chinese and then ask research assistants with strong English 
and Chinese capabilities to translate the Chinese version back into English. The two English 
versions see high convergence. To assess content validity and item readability, we send the survey 
to ten business scholars and ten managers for a preview. Any unclear item is revised and improved 
per their feedback. We distribute the survey and collect responses using a popular online platform 
(https://www.wjx.cn/) which has over 2.6 million middle or above level managers registered as 
users. To encourage responses, the survey offers some monetary rewards to respondents who 
complete it. The survey runs for two weeks and 890 respondents fill the questionnaires. We delete 
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those responses that are incomplete, finished too fast (i.e., in less than five minutes), or with wrong 
answers to reversed questions. This process leaves us 631 useable responses. Table 2 shows the 
sample statistics.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Variables and measures 
While the measure for some of our variables has one item, others are multi-item latent variables. 
To ensure the confidence of regression results, it is paramount to verify the measurement validity 
and reliability of those latent variables. For this purpose, we undertake confirmatory factor analysis. 
The results suggest strong convergence and discriminant validity of our measures with the 
significant loadings of all items on their latent construct and no major cross loading. Cronbach’s 
alpha of all our measures is above the 0.60 threshold, indicating sufficient reliability. Following 
the standard procedure, we take the average of the multiple items as the value of a firm for each 
latent variable.  
Competitive advantage. In the present study, we use the managers’ assessment of 
performance consequences to indicate the competitive advantage of his or her firm. This measure 
is in line with the fundamental contention in literature that a firm with competitive advantage must 
outperform the rivals (Barney, 1991). Also, previous studies have long established competitive 
advantage as a multi-dimensional construct (Leiblein et al., 2017). Hence, we conceptually 
consider market share, growth prospect, and market leadership position as three sub-dimensions 
of competitive advantage (Cronbach's α =0.876).  
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Competitive network scale. The scale of a social network is perhaps the most frequently 
examined structural feature in previous research (Burt, 1992; Carpenter et al., 2012; Granovetter, 
1985). Consistently, Skilton and Bernardes (2015) also maintain that the scale of competition 
network exerts strong implications on firm strategies. Our survey asks responding managers to 
assess whether his or her firm has many competitors with similar products, target customers, or 
suppliers (Cronbach's α =0.879).  
Technology search. We adopt the three items for this variable from Sidhu, et al (2007), 
which asks about the efforts a firm invests to look for the technology-related knowledge and ideas 
within its own industry and from other industries that also apply the same technology (Cronbach's 
α =0.78). 
Product market search. The study by Laursen & Salter (2006) provides the items for this 
variable. Specifically, survey items ask whether the respondent’s company has (1) a specialized 
department to search for customer, supplier, or partner information, (2) a database to store market-
related information, (3) activities to routinely analyze, learn, and discuss market information 
(Cronbach's α =0.81).      
Related industry search. Consistent with previous research (Porter, 1980), we define 
related industries as those with complementary or substitutive products to a firm’s own products. 
Items for this variable come from the study by Terjesen and Patel (2017), which ask how much 
attention a respondent’s firm pays to the activities from industries with substitutes or complements 
(Cronbach's α =0.866). 
Control variables 
To count for the alternative explanations of competitive advantage, we add several control 
variables to the regression models. Suggested by RBV (Barney, 1991), resources and capabilities 
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within a firm constitute a fundamental basis of competitive advantage. Directly, we capture firm 
resources by asking whether a firm controls more market information, business resources, and 
technology capabilities relative to its competitors. In addition, we employ multiple firm-level 
variables to proxy the resource endowments of a firm, namely firm scale, ownership type, and 
whether the firm is listed. Firm scale is assessed by the number of employees and two indicator 
variables are used to measure firm ownership structure (State owned =1; others =0) and its public 
status (Listed =1; other =0). In the Chinese context, the ownership structure of a firm relates 
significantly to its resources, in that state-owned enterprises normally possess more resources and 
can muster more resources than privately-owned counterparts. Similarly, listed companies also 
tend to have more access to financial capitals and other forms of resources than non-listed ones.   
We used market share and market entry to control respectively for the market power a firm 
wields and the potential influences of entry timing (i.e., early mover or latecomer). We distinguish 
between four ranked divisions of market share. A company with a market share of less than 10% 
has a score of 1, between 10% and 30% a score of 2, between 30% and 50% a score of 3, and more 
than 50% a score of 4. Market entry is also split into four categories (1= between 1 and 3 years, 
2= between 3 to 5 years, 3= between 6 and 10 years, and 4 = between 11 and 25 years). We control 
for potential age-dependence of competitive advantage by including firm age in the regressions. 
Firm age is measured with an indicator variable (1= between 1 year and 5 years since founding, 
2=between 6 and 10 years, 3=between 11 and 15 years, and 4=more than 15 years). The greater 
the value, the older the firm.  
Besides firm-level factors, we also include three fixed effects to account for influences of 
the external environment. I/O economics suggests that the industry context significantly shape the 
competitive conducts and advantage of a firm (Terjesen & Patel, 2017). As such, we include a 
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fixed effect of industry stage to control for the heterogeneous context a firm faces in the industry 
life cycle. We account for other unobserved industry variations through an industry-fixed effect 
based on the industry designation of each firm. To control for the macro environment, we use an 
area-fixed effect based on the six areas in China. These areas feature vast differences in economic 
development, market maturity, infrastructure, and institutional arrangements, which may shape the 
competitive advantage of firms.   
Results 
To check the common method bias, we apply Harman’s one-factor test. The test extracts more than 
one factor that explain 69.803% of the total variances. The first factor only accounts for 25.046% 
of the total variance. Thus, no single factor explains most of the variance, ruling out the common 
method bias. As Table 3 shows, the binary correlation coefficients among all variables are less 
than 0.45.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
To test the hypotheses, we use the ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression approach. 
We estimate nine models in total to verify the direct effect of competition network scale and the 
moderating effects of information search (Table 4). Model 1 includes all control variables, Model 
2 adds competitive network scale, Model 3 to 5 then include three information search respectively, 
Model 6 entails all controls, competitive network scale, and all three search approaches, Model 7 
to 9 add the interaction between competitive network scale and three information search actions 
respectively. The variance inflation factors of all our models are smaller than 3, suggesting no 
presence of multicollinearity.  
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
In Model 2, the coefficient of competition network scale is significant and positive 
(β=0.072; p<0.05). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the larger the competition network is, the more 
competitive advantage a firm has. This positive effect stays mostly unchanged throughout all the 
regression models, providing strong evidence for its robustness. From Model 3 to 5, each of the 
three search actions alone has a significantly positive coefficient (β=0.242, p<0.01 for technology 
search, β=0.182, p<0.01 for product market search, β=0.102, p<0.01 for related industry search). 
After entering all three search actions simultaneously into Model 6, the coefficient of technology 
search (β=0.172, p<0.01) and market search (β=0.133, p<0.01) remain significant but that of 
related industry search does not (β=0.029, p>0.05). The findings suggest that technology search 
and market search exert more robust influences on competitive advantage than does related 
industry search.    
In Model 7, the coefficient of the interaction between competition network scale and 
technology search is positive but not significant (β=0.014; p>0.10). Inconsistent with Hypothesis 
2, technology search action does not moderate the relationship between competition network scale 
and competitive advantage. Interestingly, the simple main effect of both competition network scale 
(β=0.052, p<0.10) and technology search (β=0.172, p<0.05) remain positive and significant in the 
presence of the interaction term. Even without a competition network (i.e., a monopoly), 
technology search still contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage and a firm still benefits from 
its competition network despite the absence of technology search. As such, it seems that the effect 
of either variable on competitive advantage is not contingent upon the other.     
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In Model 8, the interaction between product market search and competition network scale is 
positive but marginally significant (β=0.038, p<0.10). This finding supports Hypothesis 3 that the 
more product market search the stronger the effect of competition network on competitive 
advantage of a firm. In Model 9, the interaction term of competition network scale and related 
industry search is significantly positive (β=0.078, p<0.05). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the 
greater related industry search a firm commits in, the stronger the effect of competition network 
scale on competitive advantage. Taken together, the three moderating effects extend a clear pattern, 
the moderating effect weakens from related industry search, to product market search, and then to 
technology search. 
Robustness checks 
We perform a series of robustness checks on our results. Firstly, the effect of competition network 
scale on competitive advantage is quite solid across all our regression models. We, thus, apply 
additional validations over the moderating effect of the three information search approaches by 
adopting another widely-used method for testing moderation. Following the standard procedure 
(Kapoor & Klueter, 2015), we split the entire sample into an upper and a lower regime according 
to the mean value of each search approach, run the full model with all independent variables on 
both regimes, and then compare the coefficient of the competition network scale. The inter-regime 
difference in this coefficient attests to whether the effect of competition network scale varies 
between firms with a low or high level of each information search. Table 5 shows the results. 
Model 10a and 10b are the regressions on the regimes divided by the mean of technology search, 
Model 11a and 11b on the regimes divided by the mean of market search, and Model 12a and 12b 
on the regimes divided by the mean of related-industry search. 
------------------------------------ 
 
23 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
In both Model 10a and 10b, the coefficient of competition network size is positive but not 
significant (β=0.049, p>0.1 and β=0.030, p>0.1 respectively). This evidence further substantiates 
the finding of Model 7 that the effect of competition network size is indifferent to the level of 
technology search across firms. In Model 11a, the coefficient of competition network size is 
insignificantly negative (β= -0.009, p>0.1) but becomes positive and significant in Model 11b (β= 
0.090, p<0.05). This pattern also clearly appears in Model 12a and 12b (β = -0.019, p>0.1 and β= 
0.103, p<0.05). Per these findings and consistent with our suppositions, both market search and 
related-industry search are a key contingency to the effect of competition network scale. 
Competition network offers a source of competitive advantage for a firm with a strong market 
search or related-industry search but may become a strategic liability (indicated by the negative 
coefficient in the low regime) if a firm falls short of either search approach. Overall, Model 11a to 
Model 12b present additional evidence to the early findings in Model 7 to 9 that both market search 
and related industry search foster the positive effect of competition network scale but not 
technology search.  
Two other concerns remain regarding the validity of our findings. One stems from the 
variance-based approach of our analysis. This approach is suitable to validate hypotheses but may 
be limited in providing direct evidence as to the underlying processes or mechanisms (Khanagha 
et al., 2020). The other concern is the subjective nature of our data, especially those on the three 
performance dimensions of competitive advantage measure3. It would be ideal to link competition 
network scale in our survey with the objective performance measure of the firms (e.g., market 
                         
3 We are thankful to the editor for identifying this concern.  
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share, return on assets, Tobin’s Q, etc.). This enhances the objectivity of the results and conforms 
to the definition of competition network – it is a perceptive construct by managers. This ideal 
approach, nonetheless, is infeasible in our context as the survey, for the anonymity reason, omits 
the identification of the respondents including his or her affiliations and denies the possibility of 
retrieving the objective performance of their firms. In this situation, previous research has 
suggested to source qualitative evidence as an alternative validation approach (Kapoor & Klueter, 
2015; Powell et al., 1996). The two remaining concerns, thus, call for the qualitative analysis. 
Correspondingly, we focus on two key inquiries – whether competition network indeed promotes 
competitive advantage and how this effect unfolds.  
We employ a semi-structured interview to collect qualitative data. To qualify for our 
research, the informant must be a top echelon in his or her organization, who directly involves and 
has influential power in the making of strategic decisions. These qualified individuals, nevertheless, 
rarely have time for an extensive interview or repeated interviews, rendering an in-depth single 
case approach infeasible. These considerations lead us to adopt a multi-case study method with a 
relatively brief interview. To foster the generalizability of our findings, we carefully select 
informants so that their managerial positions and firm characters like ownership structure, major 
business lines, and industry segments can be as diverse as possible. We ask open-ended questions 
and cautiously avoid showing or implying our research objectives and interests during every 
interview. This ensures the perspectives from the informants are genuine and voluntary, which is 
critical for observing the underlying patterns or themes. Eventually, we complete interviews with 
13 informants who come from different companies; each interview lasts for about an hour. Table 
6 reports details of the informants and company background. Most of these firms are purely 
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domestic in China, two are joint ventures between Chinese and foreign partners, and two are the 
local subsidiary of two global companies headquartered in North America.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------  
Despite their extensive heterogeneities, all informants confirm the importance of 
competitors to their firms while acknowledging the competitive tension in between. Table 7 
presents the representative quotes from the interviews. One intriguing finding is that informants 
commonly apply metaphors to describe competitors as friends, escalators, catalysts, or boosters to 
the performance and development of their firms. A general manager even goes so far as to assert 
that his company would not have existed if not for competitors. Even when some managers see no 
chance to cooperate with competitors in their unique settings, they still admit that their companies 
benefit from competitors in many accounts. Hence, qualitative evidence forcefully substantiates 
that competitors are more than enemies to a firm but contribute to its competitive advantage. Given 
the top position of these informants, their unanimous observations add confidence to the prediction 
that competition network would significantly enhance firm performance if we were able to 
measure it objectively.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------  
We follow up by asking the informants to identify and elaborate on the specific benefits 
their companies gain from competitors. Here the responses start to diversify by showing a high 
degree of firm- and individual-specificity. However, one clear fact is that nearly all the benefits 
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mentioned by the informants are in the form of knowledge or information and acquired through a 
learning procedure – albeit in varied approaches. This finding is highly consistent with our 
contention that the strategic benefits in the competition network are mostly informational in nature 
and deliberately searching, processing, and assimilating the information by a focal firm represents 
an important accessing instrument. Besides, most of the responses bear on three dominant themes 
namely technology, market, and other industries4. Table 8 contains the representative quotes. 
These three main themes correspond tightly with the theoretical mechanisms we propose from the 
DC perspective, thereby offering strong validations to the linkage between competition network 
and competitive advantage.   
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Previous research has generally viewed competitors of a firm through a negative lens, but we 
maintain that competitors are also an important source of a firm’s competitive advantage. We 
develop this counterintuitive view by positioning a firm in its competition network (Skilton & 
Bernardes, 2015) and by drawing the theoretical foundation from the DC perspective (Helfat et al., 
2007; Salvato & Vassolo, 2018). Specifically, a firm through its competition network can gather 
valuable information about innovative ideas, market participants, and related industries from its 
competitors. This information enables it to calibrate market opportunities, modify resource base, 
and strengthen its competitive advantage. This DC-based proposition receives strong support from 
                         
4 Besides the three themes, some informants also mention that competitors together help nurture the whole market by improving 
the supply conditions and, in turn, benefit them. We do not consider this perspective in this research as the environmental 
improvement applies to all firms in an industry and, in principle, does not generate competitive advantage for any single one.    
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the empirical finding that a firm’s competitive advantage increases with its competition network 
after controlling for firm resources, industry context, and macro environment. Also, we find that 
the linkage between competition network and competitive advantage does not apply equally to all 
firms but is contingent upon their information search actions. The theoretical arguments and 
empirical findings of this study make meaningful contributions to research on competitive 
advantage, competition network, and information search.  
Scholarly implications 
The finding on the positive effect of competition network scale first contributes to the strategy 
literature by identifying an additional source of competitive advantage. Two dominant frameworks 
have underpinned most studies on competitive advantage, namely I/O economics (Porter, 1980) 
and RBV (Barney, 1991). The former highlights industry positioning and the latter emphasizes 
idiosyncratic resources as the basis for a firm to gain its advantage over rivals. While external 
industry and internal resources are undoubtedly important antecedents to firm competitiveness, 
our finding suggests that competition network a firm operates in can also play a unique role. Indeed, 
after controlling for the firm-level resources and industry effects in our empirical models, 
competition network scale explains additional variances of a firm’s competitive advantage. 
In shaping a firm’s competitive advantage, competition network extends some uniqueness 
and similarity with industry context and internal resources. Like the industry environment, 
competition network constitutes an external contextual force that affects firm competitiveness 
through an outside-in path (Chen, 1996). Rather than treating industry as the unit of analysis, 
competition network focuses on the relational structure consisting of a firm and its intra-industry 
peers (Skilton & Bernardes, 2015). This intra-industry focus makes competition network a suitable, 
analytical approach to explain the within-industry variations in firm strategy and performance, an 
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important issue I/O economics has been unable to tackle. In addition, even though lying beyond 
the organizational boundary of a firm, competition network like resources and capabilities is firm-
specific and, to a great extent, amenable to organizational decisions and actions. A firm can 
deliberately reconfigure its network by initiating or retreating from contests with other firms. Thus, 
competition network captures a contextual influence that has been missing in I/O economics and 
RBV analysis but is highly relevant to strategy.  
By highlighting a novel context, i.e., a firm’s competition network, in the moderating effect 
of the three search actions, we also advance the information search literature. Previous research, 
particularly studies from the DC perspective, has confirmed that information search within and 
outside of a given industry is of strategic importance to firm performance or even survival 
(Carpenter et al., 2012; Fleming, 2001; Helfat et al., 2007; Katila, 2002; Lopez-Vega et al., 2016). 
Consistently, our models confirm that the technology and product market search, indicated by their 
positive coefficients, significantly promote competitive advantage. More important, additional 
insights stem from the three interactions between those actions by a firm and its competition 
network. The insignificant moderating effect of technology search shows that its influence on 
competitive advantage is independent of a firm’s competition network. Product market search 
marginally promotes the positive influence of competition network. Related industry search, 
however, has a significantly positive interaction with competition network. Evidence hence reveals 
that the effect of product market search and related industry search is contingent upon the size of 
competition network. The larger the competition network, the greater the two effects.  
The moderating effect, thus, escalates from technology search, to product market search 
and then to related industry search. One speculation about this escalating pattern is the declining 
carrying capacity of competition network across the three types of information. To begin with, as 
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our findings suggest, a firm does not derive extra benefits from its competition network even if it 
increases commitments in technology search. Competition network, therefore, is barren in terms 
of technological information. This is intuitive as technologies of a firm tend to be highly 
proprietary and, for its centrality to competitive advantage, securely safeguarded. Mere search for 
the information from its competition network proves inadequate to surmount the obstacles to 
acquire technological assets or knowledge from its competitors. A formal linkage, as in a supplier-
customer relationship (Khanagha et al., 2020) and a coopetition alliance (Raza-Ullah, 2020), seems 
necessary. In contrast, competition network contains rich information about related industries as 
the corresponding search enhances the influence of competition network on advantage. Explaining 
this finding may be the common tendency of firms to undervalue the related industry information 
and to put lax protection over it against the probing of competitors. Subsequently, the related 
industry information can be relatively easy to discover and acquire from competition network if a 
firm deliberately searches for it. Comparatively, competition network may contain a moderate 
level of product market information that appear less proprietary than technology information but 
draws more protection than related industry information.      
Practical implications  
Managers can gain valuable insights from the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of this 
research. It is timely to modify the simple, negative, and incomplete view on competitors. True 
that competitors are enemies on many occasions such as price wars. They, nonetheless, contain 
beneficial information that, if acquired and exploited effectively, contributes significantly to a 
focal firm’s advantage. Indeed, from its competition network, a firm can acquire useful 
information about the product market and related industries which put it ahead of rivals. It would 
be a considerable loss if a firm single-mindedly focuses on the competitive tension but forfeits the 
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opportunities to learn strategic information from its competitors. Furthermore, managers should 
heed the information-specific carrying capacity of competition network and differentiate the search 
strategies accordingly. From a firm’s competition network, the search for market and related 
industry information will likely yield fruitful rewards but technology search may be ineffective. 
For technological knowledge, the firm may have to look somewhere else (rather than its 
competition network) and adopt another approach beyond information search (e.g., allying).     
Limitations and future extension 
Besides meaningful contributions, this study is not exempt from limitations. Firstly, for its research 
objective, this paper examines the link between competition network and competitive advantage. 
Linking competition network to other organizational outcomes like innovation, revenues, and 
profitability can potentially extend our research from strategic management to other important 
domains like revenue management. Secondly, we employ the survey method to capture the 
assessment of managers on competition network of his or her firm. Consistent with the egocentric 
nature of competition network, subjective assessment may be susceptible to individual biases. To 
address this limitation, further research is needed to map out the actual competition landscape of 
a firm and then study its strategic implications on objective performance measures. Evidence from 
this approach will be a valuable supplement to the findings of this study. Thirdly, it is necessary 
to extend the empirical context beyond one country. The present study features a single country 
design that holds the country-level environment constant. Yet, more firms are riding the wave of 
globalization to seek opportunities abroad, which exposes them to heterogeneous national contexts 
and a more diverse set of competitors. To extend the boundary of the research on competition 
network calls for more replications of our framework across national settings5. Countries in South 
                         
5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer who points out the need for this future extension. 
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America are interesting examples, which are largely emerging economies like China but 
demonstrate much distinctiveness in their cultural, political, and institutional environment 
(Vassolo, De Castro, & Gomez-Mejia, 2011). Fourthly, other structural attributes of competition 
network are worthy of more explorations. In this study, we focus on network scale as an important 
antecedent to competitive advantage; other structural characteristics like heterogeneity of the 
network may also impact a firm’s competitive advantage. 
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Figure 1. The competition network of A and B 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The research model  
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Table 1. Previous research streams on competition and competitors 
Research 
strands  
Representative 
studies 
Sources of competitive 
advantage 
Role of competitors View on 
competitors 
I/O 
economics 
(Porter, 1980; Takata, 
2016) 
Structural conditions of 
the industry  
Intensify intra-
industry competition 
and undercut industry 
profitability 
Negative 
RBV (Barnett & 
McKendrick, 2004; 
Barney, 1991; 
Leiblein et al., 2017) 
Internal resources and 
capabilities 
Imitate or substitute 
valuable resources 
and erode other 
firm’s advantage 
Negative 
Innovation (Laursen & Salter, 
2006; Lopez-Vega et 
al., 2016; Phelps, 
2010; Powell et al., 
1996; Terjesen & 
Patel, 2017; 
Trantopoulos, Von 
Krogh, Wallin, & 
Woerter, 2017) 
Unique innovations in 
technologies, products, 
services, or processes 
A potential source of 
innovation-inspiring 
ideas and knowledge  
Possibly 
positive but 
barely 
explored 
Strategic 
alliance 
(Aggarwal, 2020; 
Agostini & Nosella, 
2017; Anand et al., 
2010; Chen et al., 
2017; Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Gimeno, 2004; 
Jolink & Niesten, 
2020; Kogut, 1989; 
Luo, 2007; 
Martynov, 2019; 
Raza-Ullah, 2020; 
Vassolo et al., 2004) 
Relational benefits (e.g., 
saving on transaction 
costs, exchange of 
proprietary knowledge, 
pooling complementary 
assets, etc).  
An ally that provides 
value-generating and 
often non-tradable 
assets and 
knowledge. 
Possibly 
Positive but 
only in a 
formal 
alliance 
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Table 2. Sample descriptive statistics 
Measure Details Count % 
Industry 
Manufacturing 304 48.2 
Accommodation and catering industry 31 4.9 
Transportation industry 29 4.6 
Building industry 42 6.7 
Information and communication 125 19.8 
Finance and insurance 46 7.3 
Retail industry 31 4.9 
Others 23 3.6 
Area 
North China 138 21.9 
East China 244 38.7 
Central South Region 172 27.3 
North-east Region 39 6.1 
Southwest Region 34 5.4 
North-west region 4 0.6 
Market entry time 
Less than 3years 492 78.0 
4-8years 139 22.0 
Number of employees 
Less than10  2 0.3 
10-99 persons 115 18.2 
100-199 persons 109 17.3 
200-299 persons 85 13.5 
300-499 persons 89 14.1 
500-999 persons 105 16.6 
More than 1000 persons 126 20.0 
Market share 
Less than 10% 128 20.3 
10%-20% 234 37.1 
20%-30% 159 25.2 
30%-50% 85 13.4 
More than 50% 25 4.0 
Year of the firm 
1-5 years 82 13.0 
6-10 years 203 32.2 
11-15 years 177 28.1 
More than 15 years 169 26.7 
Period of industry 
Introduction 16 2.5 
Growth 339 53.7 
Maturity 272 43.2 
Decline 4 0.6 
Type of ownership 
State-owned company 141 22.3 
Private company 405 64.2 
Foreign-owned 68 10.8 
Collective-owned 17 2.7 
Listed or not 
Listed company 202 32.0 
Unlisted company 429 68.0 
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Table 3. Pearson correlation 
Variables Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Firm age status 0.21 1.00            
2. Market entry 0.78 0.04 1.00           
3. Firm scale  0.20 -0.13** 0.05 1.00          
4. Market share 2.44 -0.08* 0.01 0.20** 1.00         
5. Ownership 0.22 -0.14** 0.05 0.07† 0.19** 1.00        
6. Listed or not 0.32 -0.26** 0.14** 0.33** 0.25** 0.35** 1.00       
7. Firm resource 4.81 0.02 0.01 0.12** 0.28** 0.13** 0.14** 1.00      
8. Competitive advantage 4.86 0.07† 0.03 0.15** 0.45** 0.19** 0.27** 0.52** 1.00     
9. Network scale 4.88 0.00 0.09* 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.08* 0.07 0.10* 1.00    
10. Technology search 5.94 0.01 0.00 0.10* 0.17** 0.00 0.06 0.31** 0.36** 0.10* 1.00   
11. Product market search 5.32 0.00 0.05 0.09* 0.14** 0.05 0.10* 0.35** 0.37** 0.07 0.39** 1.00  
12. Related industry search 4.87 0.03 0.04 -0.08* 0.01 0.095* 0.01 0.25** 0.214** 0.12** 0.30** 0.37** 1.00 
N=631, †p＜0.10; *p＜0.05; ** p＜0.01, Two-tailed test. 
 
36 
 
Table 4. Competition advantage of a firm: network scale and interaction with information search 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant 1.814** 
(0.242) 
1.470** 
(0.28) 
0.496 
(0.326) 
0.838** 
(0.294) 
1.086** 
(0.301) 
0.205 
(0.331) 
0.199 
(0.332) 
0.220 
(0.331) 
0.175 
(0.330) 
Firm age status -0.007 
(0.093) 
-0.010 
(0.092) 
-0.028 
(0.090) 
-0.011 
(0.090) 
-0.011 
(0.092) 
-0.025 
(0.089) 
-0.025 
(0.089) 
-0.023 
(0.089) 
-0.016 
(0.089) 
Market entry  -0.141 
(0.087) 
-0.158† 
(0.087) 
-0.152† 
(0.085) 
-0.127 
(0.085) 
-0.145† 
(0.086) 
-0.053 
(0.094) 
-0.128 
(0.084) 
-0.132 
(0.084) 
-0.129 
(0.084) 
Firm scale  -0.056 
(0.097) 
-0.038 
(0.097) 
-0.053 
(0.095) 
-0.055 
(0.094) 
-0.012 
(0.096) 
0.053 
(0.094) 
-0.055 
(0.094) 
-0.053 
(0.094) 
-0.061 
(0.094) 
Market share 0.305** 
(0.036) 
0.31** 
(0.035) 
0.292** 
(0.035) 
0.302** 
(0.035) 
0.316** 
(0.035) 
0.294** 
(0.034) 
0.294** 
(0.034) 
0.291** 
(0.034) 
0.290** 
(0.034) 
Ownership 0.079 
(0.092) 
0.089 
(0.092) 
0.116 
(0.090) 
0.096 
(0.089) 
0.063 
(0.091) 
0.106 
(0.089) 
0.107 
(0.089) 
0.108 
(0.089) 
0.099 
(0.089) 
Listed or not 0.349** 
(0.090) 
0.326** 
(0.090) 
0.326** 
(0.088) 
0.307** 
(0.088) 
0.328** 
(0.089) 
0.314** 
(0.087) 
0.315** 
(0.087) 
0.311** 
(0.087) 
0.317** 
(0.087) 
Firm resource  0.410** 
(0.033) 
0.404** 
(0.033) 
0.356** 
(0.033) 
0.344** 
(0.034) 
0.377** 
(0.033) 
0.318** 
(0.034) 
0.319** 
(0.034) 
0.317** 
(0.034) 
0.312** 
(0.034) 
Network scale(a) 
 
0.072* 
(0.030) 
0.057* 
(0.029) 
0.063* 
(0.029) 
0.063* 
(0.030) 
0.052† 
(0.029) 
0.052† 
(0.029) 
0.053† 
(0.029) 
0.059* 
(0.029) 
Technology search 
(b) 
  
0.242** 
(0.044) 
  
0.172** 
(0.047) 
0.174** 
(0.047) 
0.173** 
(0.047) 
0.180** 
(0.047) 
Market search (c) 
   
0.182** 
(0.031) 
 
0.133** 
(0.034) 
0.132** 
(0.034) 
0.135** 
(0.034) 
0.128** 
(0.034) 
Related industry 
search (d) 
    
0.102** 
(0.031) 
0.029 
(0.032) 
0.030 
(0.032) 
0.026 
(0.032) 
0.031 
(0.032) 
a*b 
      
0.014 
(0.033) 
 
 
a*c 
      
 0.038† 
(0.032) 
 
a*d 
      
  0.078* 
(0.033) 
Industry stage  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Industry sector √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Area √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Adj R2 0.389 0.394 0.421 0.424 0.415 0.437 0.437 0.438 0.441 
F-value 41.177** 38.262** 39.23** 39.71** 36.54** 35.97** 33.54** 33.69** 34.19** 
Sample size = 631 observations. The dependent variable is competitive advantage of a firm assessed by responding 
managers on three dimensions, namely current market share, market leadership, and growth prospect. Results from 
Harman’s one-factor test rules out the common method bias in our measurement. Maximum variance inflation factor 
(VIF) of all models is less than 3, indicating the absence of multicollinearity problem. Interacting variables are mean-
centered. Values in parentheses are standard errors. All models contain three fixed effects, Industry stage, Industry, 
and Area, to control for the potential impacts of unobserved industry conditions and geographic locations. 
Model 1 includes all control variables. Model 2 adds the independent variable, network scale (a), and its regression 
coefficient tests H1. Model 3 to 5 separately estimates the direct effect of technology search (b), market search (c), 
and related industry search (d) while Model 6 includes all independent variables. Model 7 to 9 estimates the interaction 
between network scale and each of the three information searches, which respectively verifies H2, 3, and 4.  
†p＜0.10; *p＜0.05; ** p＜0.01 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 5. Regressions on split sample 
 
Technology search  Market search  Industry search 
Model 10a  
Lower 
regime 
Model 10b  
Upper 
regime 
 
Model11a  
Lower 
regime 
Model11b 
Upper 
regime 
 
Model 12a 
Lower 
regime 
Model 12b 
Upper 
regime 
Constant 
0.379 
(0.484) 
-0.398 
(0.802) 
 
1.266* 
(0.541) 
0.405** 
(0.824) 
 
0.749 
(0.530) 
-0.324 
(0.728) 
Firm age status 
0.001** 
(0.131) 
-0.165 
(0.144) 
 
-0.153 
(0.148) 
0.023 
(0.122) 
 
-0.185 
(0.145) 
0.058 
(0.127) 
Market entry 
0.087 
(0.124) 
-0.282* 
(0.131) 
 
0.091 
(0.136) 
-0.248* 
(0.120) 
 
0.026 
(0.135) 
-0.155 
(0.119) 
Scale  
0.114 
(0.142) 
-0.276† 
(0.142) 
 
0.093 
(0.154) 
-0.230† 
(0.130) 
 
0.006 
(0.141) 
-0.178 
(0.142) 
Market share 
0.318** 
(0.052) 
0.251** 
(0.052) 
 
0.249** 
(0.057) 
0.339** 
(0.048) 
 
0.313** 
(0.054) 
0.229** 
(0.051) 
Ownership 
-0.079 
(0.136) 
0.235† 
(0.134) 
 
0.049 
(0.146) 
0.091 
(0.122) 
 
-0.101 
(0.151) 
0.228† 
(0.124) 
Listed or not 
0.373** 
(0.128) 
0.274* 
(0.134) 
 
0.431** 
(0.143) 
0.273* 
(0.121) 
 
0.495** 
(0.136) 
0.164 
(0.128) 
Resource  
0.336** 
(0.046) 
0.344** 
(0.058) 
 
0.347** 
(0.054) 
0.325** 
(0.048) 
 
0.309** 
(0.050) 
0.375** 
(0.053) 
Network size 
0.049 
(0.041) 
0.030 
(0.043) 
 
-0.009 
(0.045) 
0.090* 
(0.039) 
 
-0.019 
(0.043) 
0.103* 
(0.041) 
Tech search 
0.150* 
(0.070) 
0.249* 
(0.112) 
 
0.065 
(0.060) 
0.205** 
(0.076) 
 
0.132* 
(0.061) 
0.080 
(0.074) 
Market search 
0.102* 
(0.045) 
0.191** 
(0.054) 
 
0.048 
(0.060) 
0.072 
(0.108) 
 
0.114* 
(0.048) 
0.197** 
(0.063) 
Related industry search 
0.039 
(0.046) 
-0.003 
(0.050) 
 
0.066 
(0.050) 
-0.039 
(0.045) 
 
0.070 
(0.061) 
0.053 
(0.083) 
Industry stage  √ √  √ √  √ √ 
Industry sector √ √  √ √  √ √ 
Area √ √  √ √  √ √ 
Adj R2 0.426 0.342  0.314 0.357  0.390 0.385 
F-value 17.628** 12.681**  11.259** 13.472**  15.342 13.448** 
N 315 316  315 316  315 316 
The three pairs of regressions run on three pairs of subsamples. The first pair of subsamples is from the split of the 
total sample according to the mean value of technology search, with the sample below the mean as the lower regime 
(N=315) but that above as the upper regime (N=316). Similarly, the second and the third subsamples are from the split 
based on the mean value of market search and related-industry search. On these subsamples, the same regression 
model is estimated, which includes all control and independent variables and the three fixed effects – industry age, 
industry sector, and geographic areas. 
Contrasting the coefficient of network size in each pair of the regressions verifies the moderating effect of each 
information search. In Model 10a and 10b, the coefficient of network size is insignificant, suggesting that the effect 
of competition network is invariant whether the firm is strong or weak in technology search. In Model 11a and 11b, 
the coefficient of network size is first negative and insignificant but then turns positive and significant. This change 
strongly supports that competition network produces competitive advantage when the firm has high market search. 
The same result also appears in Model 12a and 12b, which positions related-industry search as an important 
contingency to the link between competition network and competitive advantage.      
†p＜0.10; *p＜0.05; ** p＜0.01 
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Table 6 Informant and company background 
 
 Informant Position Company Industry Products or services 
1. General Manager State-owned Manufacturing, 
oligopoly industry 
Car seats (manufacturing and design) 
2. Vice President Foreign-Sino joint 
venture 
Metallurgical 
industry 
Aluminum ingot (manufacturing and 
sales)  
3. Vice General Manager Foreign-Sino Joint 
Venture 
Manufacturing Design and manufacturing steering 
system of cars 
4. General Manager State-owned Manufacturing R&D, manufacturing, and sales of 
electronics 
5. Vice General Manager State-private joint 
venture 
Manufacturing Manufacturing heat exchangers 
6. Founder and General 
Manager 
Private  Service Consultation on strategic planning 
and management 
7. Marketing Director Private Manufacturing Feed additives 
8. Chief Financial Officer Private Manufacturing Kitchen appliances (e.g., range 
hoods, ovens, dishwashers) 
9. National Chief 
Marketing Officer  
Multinational 
enterprise 
Restaurant  Coffee shop chain 
10. Chief Financial Officer State-owned Manufacturing R&D, manufacturing semi-
conductors 
11. Chief Operation 
Officer 
State-owned Service Building and running incubators of 
start-ups 
12. Chief Operation 
Officer 
Private Manufacturing Manufacturing chemicals  
13. Chief Executive 
Officer 
Multinational 
enterprise 
Restaurant Fast-food chain  
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Table 7. Performance impacts of competition network 
 
 
 
 
 Representative quotes from the informants 
1. It is the competitors that give us inexhaustible incentives to grow. No competition no improvement. 
Competitors are inherently good, and the right view is to see them as friends.  
2. Market competition is fierce and ruthless, but our competitors are the escalators to the development of 
our company. 
3. Competitors have profoundly helped our strategy and operation, including strategic positioning in China 
and across the world, technology leadership, strategic renewal, and the improvement of our management 
capabilities.  
4. Competitors are the catalysts and boosters of our company, especially in R&D. They force us to 
relentlessly seek further development and competitive advantage.  
5. Currently, competition is intense and there is no way for competitors to become cooperators. Yet, we 
still constantly learn from them; their existence pushes us to improve product quality and build differentiation 
advantage. 
6. We both compete and cooperate with our rivals. It is important to maintain a good relationship with 
them. With countless private companies, our market features full competition. Only with a good relationship 
with each other can we lift up the technological level of this market.  
7. They (i.e., competitors) are not only rivals to us; we cooperate in many fields. Sometimes we can form 
a supplier-customer relationship per the requirement of our clients or collaborate in some human resource 
training programs.  
8. Competitors can be considered as pure rivals given the intense competition in our market. But we all 
develop together by imitating and learning the strengths of each other. Competitors usually focus on the same 
issues or problems and through communications and competition we may create new innovative opportunities 
together.  
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Table 8. The strategic benefits from competition network 
 
Strategic benefits from 
competition network 
Representative quotes from the informants 
Technology 
information 
We monitor closely the technologies of competitors, which may settle the 
developmental trend of our industry for the next 2 or 3 decades.  
The technological innovation of our companies benefits a lot from domestic 
and foreign competitors. They also inspire us to locate R&D centers in the best 
countries and source talents across the world.  
We focus on the R&D activities of our competitors, especially the cutting-
edge technologies. Our industry is in the transition from a traditional manufacturing 
industry to a high-tech one. Many intelligent technologies are fast developing. 
Hence, we follow closely our competitors’ steps that make products light and 
intelligent.  
We attach great importance to competitors, especially the development of new 
products and advanced technologies.  
The technologies of competitors are critical learning subjects. We don’t learn 
their skills and methods in just one specific area but normally at every stage of the 
supply chain from design, to R&D, to manufacturing, and then to the development 
of applications.   
Competitors can help spot the deficiency in our technologies and production 
processes and even suggest solutions. The technological solutions provided by 
competitors to their clients usually serve as the reference for sensing the future 
direction of new technologies and new products.  
Market information It is a routine to collect market information from competitors. We have 
common customers and serve the same market segments.  
Through observing our competitors, we gather important data as to our 
common market segment and customer demands. Such data offer a basis for 
predicting the future development of our industry. From them, we scout the industry 
dynamics, government policies, and supplier selection, distribution channel design, 
and logistics.   
Low price is the key competitive weapon of our competitors to win market 
shares. Hence, we pay special attention to their pricing strategy as well as how they 
execute it through slashing costs. They are our learning subjects.  
Benchmarking against competitors, we have managed to improve our 
customer services, increase customer satisfaction, and reduce management costs. 
Competitors and we are interdependent now.  
Among the Foreign-Sino joint ventures, the ones between Chinese and 
European partners and between Chinese and American partners take high market 
shares in our industry. They are truly skillful at market development and how they 
achieve that is a key lesson to us.  
We have weekly meetings to examine our major competitors. What customers 
do they target? Any major campaign? How are they performing? Answers to these 
questions enable us to draw the market landscape of our industry.  
Other industry 
information 
The knowledge we acquire from competitors is not limited to technical skills 
in a specific field or even to just our own industry. In fact, the scope of our 
surveillance and analysis spans across industries wherever we see them relevant. 
Competitors provide us with valuable information on how to diversify and 
operate in other unfamiliar industries. We also source critical input to creating and 
modifying our technological service to fit in other industry scenarios.   
Semi-conductors have a wide range of applications, so our industry is linked 
to many industries like information security, vehicles, internet, e-commerce, etc. 
Subsequently, we watch carefully how competitors design and develop 
semiconductors as well as the related applications in other industries.  
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